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Summary 
The growths in the analysis of inter- firm contractual relationship that has occurred in 
recent years is an indication of the importance economists’ associate with the issue of 
contracting and contract design (Masten & Saussier, 2002). However, none has to the 
author’s knowledge written about buyers enforcement decisions of contractual penalty 
clauses, although these decisions are not rare and often difficult to handle. The problem 
occurs as a consequence from delays to the left (upstream) for the focal firm in a 
traditional supply chain model, placing the problem within the purchasing-literature. 
Compared with other business disciplines relatively little academic research has been 
undertaken in the area of purchasing, explaining why there is quite a gap in the 
development of a solid body of knowledge compared with other disciplines in business 
administration (Van Weele, 2005). Market and organizational coordination are the two 
ideal types of coordination device for economic transactions, but in real life we usually 
encounter hybrid types of organizations (Douma & Schreuder, 2008), where the contract is 
a common coordination device. Contracts provide an evolving governance structure for 
relationships (Seshadri & Mishra, 2004), and a large and growing literature has analyzed 
the inefficiencies that arise in a world in which contracts are incomplete (Anderlini & 
Felli, 2004).  Contracting parties may stipulate in advance the amount for compensation 
when there is a breach of contract (Hagstrøm, 2003), what is called a penalty clause. These 
clauses can have multiple objectives, were providing incentives for the supplier to deliver 
on-time are one of them. A number of authors and recent experimental studies suggest that 
sanctions, controls and explicit incentives can crowd out intrinsic motivation and may even 
be counterproductive (Herold, 2010), and a large number of experimental and field studies 
indicate that economic decisions are in many cases motivated not only by material self 
interest, but also by concerns for fairness (Stanca et al. 2009).  
 
This thesis therefore seeks out to answer how enforcement of penalty clauses impact 
supplier’s incentives and behavior, and how this impact the success of governmental 
projects. It will do so by employing a single case study approach where it holds the 
Norwegian Armed Forces and their contractual framework as the collective unit of 
analysis, and seeks out to explore the phenomenon of delays and use of penalty clauses in 
a governmental buyers’ contract design. It attempts doing so by utilizing a cross-sectional 
semi structured interview design to access primary data from a sample of nine contract 
officers and project managers in the Norwegian Armed Forces, and retrieve secondary data 
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from laws, instructions, propositions and reports. It mainly builds its foundation on 
theories within purchasing and contract theory, especially agency theory and transaction 
cost economics.  
 
In commercial businesses project delays and cost overruns are becoming major problems 
in many projects (Bubshait, 2003), and this is also the issue in the Armed Forces projects 
(OAD PR 13/2005). Van Weele (2005) argues that decision making within governmental 
bodies is far from transparent, due to the many stakeholders involved, the often conflicting 
interests among these, and the many political aspects that need to be considered, and this 
explains why decision making concerning, for instance, buying defence equipment is often 
troublesome and difficult to manage. The findings of the study are vague, but indicate that 
there is widespread opinions to the effect penalty clause have on the Armed Forces 
projects, and that further studies are necessary to better understand the phenomenon.  The 
problem of penalty clauses is one of the very few in contract law and economic where 
there is considerable disagreement among economists, but also among legal scholars 
(Hatzis, 2003). 
The value of this research for both scholars and the Armed Forces is a better understanding 
and awareness of governmental buyers’ enforcement-decisions of contractual penalty 
clauses ex post. 
 
 
Keywords: Public procurement, contract design, penalty clause, , military, decision 
making, Agency theory. 
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1.INTRODUCTION 
Economics is based on incentives, and it derives it strength from being able to predict how 
people change their behaviour in response to changes in incentives (Fehr & Falk, 2002). 
The focus of attention in this study is the relation between a governmental buyer’s use of 
penalties as incentives mechanism and the sellers respond in behaviour. 
 
Since the founding father of modern economics Adam Smith (1904) in 1776 introduced 
the principle “division of labour” organizations has become more and more specialized. In 
line with increased globalization and rapid change in technology, organizations focus on 
what their core activities are, or should be, and business methods like outsourcing, 
performance based logistics, third, fourth and even fifth part logistics has been introduced 
into the business manager’s vocabulary. Organizations of today are increasingly dependent 
on others both nationally and internationally, and different countries pass laws and enter 
into treaties how to protect and regulate these relationships. Within this atmosphere parties 
often formalize their obligations towards each other in a contract.  
 
The promise of payment from the buyer when the supplier has delivered agreed goods 
gives the supplier an incentive to deliver in order to harvest the profit. However, timely 
supply of materials and inputs are essential for organizations and this positive incentive is 
not always sufficient incentive for a supplier to deliver within agreed time. If the supplier 
has alternatives that outperform the lost interest rate, he might breach the contract and 
prioritize to sell to someone else for a higher profit. In order to mitigate this problem, 
contracting parties may stipulate in advance the amount for compensation when there is a 
breach of contract (Hagstrøm, 2003). This is called a penalty clause. These clauses can 
have multiple purposes, where one of them is to give incentives to deliver an agreed 
performance or product within an agreed time.  
 
Even so, delay still happens, giving rise to conflicts. So, how will the buyer handle this? 
Will buyer’s enforcement of these clauses change supplier’s incentives? If so, will it 
further change their behaviour regarding fulfilment of their obligations? And how will this 
damage the buyer? Are there any difference between a commercial buyer seeking to 
maximize profit for his shareholders and a governmental buyer that might have other goals 
than maximize profit? Are there circumstances where a buyer shouldn’t enforce the 
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penalty clause, although it means lost cost reduction, and he is within the law, and what 
initially was agreed upon by both parties when signing a contract? Can existing theory 
help us answer these questions? Handling contracts in connection with buying and selling 
are critical regarding success in organizations (Rognes, 1999), and these questions are not 
easy to answer, although they are not unusual thoughts for many buyers. 
 
The Norwegian Armed Forces has long traditions in embedding penalty clauses in their 
contracts, thus competent decision makers in the Armed Forces are a necessity in order to 
make the necessary considerations when dealing with these issues.  
 
In June 2005 the Office of the Auditor General of Norway submitted to the Storting an 
examination report of 19 defence equipment procurement projects in the Norwegian 
Armed Forces.  The findings showed that seven of these projects were four years behind 
schedule. Eight of the projects had incurred costs which were significantly higher than the 
originally approved budget. Four projects delivered equipment showing substantial 
shortcomings. (OAG, PR 13/2005). Five years later (during the finalizing of this study) 
there is an article in a newspaper under the heading “Quarrel concerning settlement” with a 
picture of one of the frigates from the Armed Forces biggest single procurement project 
ever, consisting of  five frigates budgeted to 18.3 billion NOK. There have been delays in 
all deliveries, and the last frigate was delivered in January 2011, more than a year delayed. 
The Armed Forces has postponed the decision to enforce penalties towards the Spanish 
shipyard Navantia. According to the newspaper the reason for this is that the shipyard 
blames the Armed Forces for the delays, and has submitted a ten-digit claim towards the 
Armed Forces. (Bergens Tidende, 23.10. 2010 p. 6.). The cost associated with not 
effectively resolving or managing conflict in a complex project setting are always 
detrimental (Sutterfield et al., 2007). When the Office of the Auditor General of Norway 
criticized the Armed Forces for not enforcing the penalties, the Armed Forces justifiesd 
their decision the by saying “there has been a trade-off to achieve the best possible project 
implementation within the contract limits” (OAG dok 1 2010-2011 p.144.). 
 
The main objective with this first chapter is to introduce the study and the structure of this 
thesis. This chapter is further divided into six sections. The first section presents the 
research problem of this study and why this study has to be conducted. The second section 
briefly provides the purpose, method of study and the significance of the study. The third 
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section presents the aims and objectives. The fourth section provides some background in 
order to better understand the context and significance of the problem addressed in this 
study. The fifth section provides some limitations, and the last section gives a description 
of the structure of the whole thesis. 
 
1.1 Research Problem and its relevance 
There is no universal agreement on what constitutes a research worthy problem, but from a 
scientific perspective, a research problem may be defined as a “general issue, concern, or 
controversy addressed in research, and must integrate concepts and theoretical perspective 
of the literature into the problem to be addressed” (Ellis & Levy, 2008). It appears that 
there is a clear consensus in literature that identification of a problem is a cornerstone for 
any quality research (ibid.).  
 
The overlying purpose of the people elected parliament in Norway concerning public 
spending are as follows: “The law with corresponding regulations shall contribute to 
increased value creation in the Norwegian community by securing the most effective use 
of resources when conducting public procurement based on businesslike and equal 
treatment.”(Lov om offentlige anskaffelser (LOA), 2006). The Norwegian Armed Forces 
has in their general purchasing conditions embedded a penalty clause. When delays occur 
a governmental buyer such as the Armed Forces are faced with the decision if to enforce it 
or not. A number of authors and recent experimental studies suggest that sanctions, 
controls and explicit incentives can crowd out intrinsic motivation and may even be 
counterproductive (Herold, 2010). There are not always clear answers to when a 
governmental decision maker not shall enforce the penalty clause, if the level of the 
authority to not enforce penalties is reasonable, and which qualifications the decision 
making unit should possess in order to secure the best project completion and support for 
the materials lifecycle.  The decision maker must have a holistic overview regarding 
stakeholders, supplier’s incentives and behaviour, and applicable rules. Trade-offs must 
sometimes be made. Van Weele (2005) argues that decision making within governmental 
bodies is far from transparent, due to the many stakeholders involved, the often conflicting 
interests among these, and the many political aspects that need to be considered, and this 
explains why decision making concerning, for instance, buying defence equipment is often 
troublesome and difficult to manage.  
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Material acquisitions to the Norwegian Armed Forces are often delayed, and when delays 
occur, the lack of definite guidelines in combination with penalty clauses in the contract 
design might impose a decision problem upon a governmental buyer like the Armed 
Forces wither they shall enforce penalties towards their suppliers or not. 
 
1.2 Purpose, method, and significance of the study  
This study has a two-sided purpose. Firstly, it aims at giving the contractual department in 
the Norwegian Armed forces a better foundation for decision-making in connection with 
enforcement of penalties towards their suppliers. Secondary, it attempts to make a small, 
but original contribution to the accumulated purchasing and contract knowledge by 
exploring and analyzing the positive and negative aspects of a governmental buyers’ 
enforcement of penalty clauses. 
 
This study employs a single case study approach where it holds the Norwegian Armed 
Forces and their contractual framework as the collective unit of analysis, and seeks out to 
explore the phenomenon of delays and use of penalty clauses in a governmental buyers’ 
contract design. It attempts doing so by utilizing a cross-sectional semi structured 
interview design to access primary data from a sample of contract officers and project 
managers in the Norwegian Armed Forces, and retrieve secondary data from laws, 
instructions, propositions and reports. It mainly builds its foundation on theories within 
purchasing and contract theory, especially agency theory and transaction cost economics.  
 
The growths in the analysis of inter- firm contractual relationship that has occurred in 
recent years is an indication of the importance economists’ associate with the issue of 
contracting and contract design. (Masten & Saussier, 2002). However, the competence and 
focus on contracting has traditionally been seen from the supplier side (Rognes, 1999) 
None has to the author’s knowledge written about buyers enforcement decisions of 
contractual penalty clauses, although these decisions are not rare and often difficult to 
handle.  
What makes research of interest is how it will impact future research and other researchers, 
not the author (Ellis & Levy, 2008). The value of this research for both scholars and the 
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Armed Forces is a better understanding and awareness of governmental buyers’ 
enforcement-decisions of contractual penalty clauses ex post. 
 
1.3 Aims and objectives 
The principal aim of this thesis is to contribute to a better understanding of the complexity 
in the decision making when handling penalty clauses in governmental contracts, and this 
thesis attempts to approach the problem and aim by employing the following main 
research question (infra p. 15 ): 
 
How does enforcement of penalty clauses impact supplier’s incentives 
and behavior, and how does this impact the success of the projects 
 in the Norwegian Armed Forces? 
 
Figure 1. Impact chain 
 
 
In order to achieve the aim and answer the research question; the following research 
objectives has been identified: 
 
RO1 Identify how the Armed Forces measure project success 
RO2 Identify the frequency of delays  
RO3  Identify possible reasons for delays 
RO4 Identify the effects the delays has on the Armed Forces 
RO5 Identify incentive mechanisms used by the Armed Forces  
RO6 Identify which effect embedding penalty clauses in contracts as incitement for 
reducing risk of delays has on supplier behaviour 
RO7 Identify how enforcement of these penalty clauses impacts the delays 
enforcing penalty 
clause 
impacts suppliers 
incentives?  
Impacts suppliers 
behaviour? 
Impacts Projects 
Key performance 
indicators (Project 
goals)?  
Impacts the success 
of the project? 
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RO8 Identify how not enforcing these penalties might affect the project success 
RO9 Identify special considerations for governmental governance 
RO10 Recommend at which level the decision making authority should be 
RO11 Recommend factors excusing suppliers from being penalized 
RO12 Recommend which competence which is needed at the decision making unit 
 
1.4 Background   
The existence for the Norwegian Armed Forces is production and use of military 
capacities. This is carried out through their three business areas (Håndbok i stabstjeneste 
for Forsvaret, 2010) See figure 2. 
  
 
 
 Figure 2. Norwegian Armed Forces business areas 
  
  
In order to carry out the operational activities and force production the Armed Forces are 
dependent on personnel, information/communication technology, property/construction, 
and material (ibid.).   
 
Threats, changes in the global political landscape, terrorism and piracy create an evolving 
need for new materiel investments. Bureaucracy regarding prioritizing need/projects, 
planning, funding, and regulation means that time already may be critical when the 
business support group enter into contracts with suppliers. Most countries still seem to 
struggle on how to control and monitor governmental purchasing expenditure effectively 
(Van Weele, 2005).  
Operational activities – 
application of military 
capabilities 
Force production – 
production of military 
capability 
Business support – 
production of resources to 
the two business areas above 
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High degree of materiel deficiencies caused by delayed investments projects is currently a 
major problem within the Norwegian Armed Forces. The Office of the Auditor General of 
Norway, responsible for ensuring that the Norwegian community's resources and assets are 
used and administered in keeping with the Storting's decisions has the last decade 
repeatedly criticized Ministry of Defence (MoD) for the long delays on new defence 
materiel. They’re claiming that it hampers the Armed Forces restructuring of the defence 
sector, and severely affects the Armed Forces operational capability. The Auditor General 
stated in their latest report delivered to the Norwegian parliament in January 2009 the 
following:  
 
“The Norwegian Armed Forces' overall operational capability has been reduced during 
the period 2005 to 2008. The defence sector has not implemented the adopted structure 
during the period because of material deficiencies relating to materiel, personnel and 
exercises”(OAG PR 1/2009). 
 
 In 2008 the Auditor General stated:  
 
“The Norwegian Armed Forces have inadequate access to materiel and staff for 
operations abroad….This is a serious situation, and there are grounds to question whether 
the Armed Force’s capacity to conduct international assignments is in line with the 
intentions of the Storting,”(OAG PR 2/2008)  
 
1.4.1 Clarification of differences between liquidated damages, 
underliquidated damages and penalties 
These terms are often used interchangeable in different academic literature. Norwegian 
law speak of “konvensjonalbot” which in its simplest way can be translated as an “agreed 
penalty”. Sometimes parties to a contract ex ante agree upon how much compensation will 
have to be paid should one of them breach the contract. These stipulated damages are 
called liquidated damages when they are ex ante reasonable estimations of true losses. 
They are called underliquidated damages when they are undercompensatory and penalty 
clauses when they are deliberately overcompensatory in order to create an additional 
sanction (De Geest, 1999).  
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Choosing not to enforce an agreed penalty, comes close to what is called an annullable 
penalty within the academic theory of law (De Geest et al. 2009). An annullable penalty is 
a sanction s that is applied unless monitoring takes place–which occurs with probability p- 
and the agent is found non-shirking. Under annullable penalties, the agent’s expected 
sanction is s in case of shirking and (1−p)s in case of non-shirking (ibid.). 
 
1.4.2  Remedy to reduce risk of delay 
One remedy intended to mitigate the risk of these delays is to use incentive mechanisms in 
the contract design, such as a penalty clause. As a consequence of these delays, and the 
contract design, project managers and contract officers in the Armed Forces faces the 
decision problem wither the penalty clause should be enforced or not, or to which extent it 
should be enforced. Since every project is unique it is difficult to give a concrete solution 
to this problem. These costs are difficult to measure and therefore pre determined 
liquidated damages are often preferred instead of reimbursements of actual costs. Thus it is 
common to include clauses for liquidated damages in these purchasing contracts. This has 
a two sided purpose. Firstly it will give the supplier an incentive to fulfil his part of the 
agreement on time, and partly give compensation for the loss inflicted upon the Armed 
Forces. The rationale behind using penalty clauses is to give suppliers incentive to perform 
on time, and prevent what is called shirking within agency theory. This can e.g. be 
prioritizing efforts towards other customers, reduce labour efforts etc. 
1.4.3  Today’s practice regarding enforcement of penalty in the Armed 
Forces 
In practice suppliers must accept penalty clauses in the contract in order to enter into a 
relationship with the armed forces. Enforcement of penalties happens in principle 
automatically by delay (ARF). As a rule of thumb the Armed Forces will deduct the 
penalty amount (according to length of delay and clauses in the contract) from the received 
invoice. It is the suppliers’ obligation to plead not to enforce or reduce the amount, and 
provide the information necessary. Next step is discussion between project manager and 
the projects contract officer how to handle the matter. The result often ends out in a 
negotiation with the supplier, trying to achieve an attainable result for both parties. It is the 
researcher’s belief that the level of good result achieved is highly dependent on the 
experience of the negotiator. 
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There has been an increasing use (in Norway) of extensive and complex contract terms 
(Lilleholt, 2009). The Armed Forces has established “General Purchase Conditions 
(GPC)” that often is used as an appendix to simpler contracts. For larger and more 
complex contracts the purchase conditions often are a matter of negotiation. However, the 
established purchase conditions are a starting place when the Armed Forces make their 
negotiation strategy.  
 
The GPC states that the Armed forces can demand penalties from the Contractor when 
delays occur, regardless of whether the Armed Forces actually have incurred additional 
costs as a result of the delay. The penalty is a daily fine calculated per delayed working 
day an shall amount to 1 per mille of the price of that part of the delivery that has been 
delayed, and if applicable, of the price of those parts of the delivery that cannot be put to 
use as intended due to the delay. The penalty is normally limited to 10 percent of the parts 
price. 
 
In addition the GPC states that the Armed Forces are entitled to compensation for direct 
losses incurred as a result of the delay. If the delay is caused by the Contractor’s 
negligence, the Armed Forces are also entitled to compensation for indirect losses as a 
result of the delay. 
The internal instruction for the Defence sector, not legal binding “Anskaffelsesregelverk 
for Forsvarssektoren” (ARF) provides guidelines for the use of liquidated damages. It 
states that enforcement of liquidated damages in principle follows automatic when delays 
occur. ARF opens up for the possibility that the Armed Forces can with exception choose 
not to enforce the penalties. For amount above 250.000 NOK the decision lies with the 
Department of Defence. 
 
1.5 Limitations 
There are many different ways to reduce the risk of delays, and often in combination. The 
thesis only looks at the penalty clause, and is based on experiences from the Armed Forces 
as a customer. Experiences from the supplier side are not treated in this thesis. 
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Not seldom Norwegian newspapers claims that the Armed Forces’ material investments 
are delayed according to plan. This doesn’t necessary mean that they are delayed 
according to contract. In this thesis delays are defined as according to agreed upon in a 
contract. 
 
Most of the literature concerning penalty clauses in buyer-supplier relationship stems from 
the academic community within law. While the focus for this thesis is wither to enforce the 
penalty clause or not with the buyer as decision maker, the focus in this community is seen 
from a court’s point of view and addresses questions like when stipulated damages can and 
cannot be enforced by a judge. Court enforcement has several possible sources of 
imperfection (Legros & Newman, 2002). The author sees a court’s decision merely as a 
risk, and a reason that might prevent enforcement.  
1.6 Thesis structure 
 
This thesis is divided into six chapters. The first chapter gave introduced the study and 
presented a description of the research problem and aims and objectives, and  further 
provided necessary background information in order to understand the context and 
significance of the question addressed. 
 
Chapter two provides the necessary theoretical foundation of which this research is built 
upon. Chapter three provides information about the unit of analysis:  the Armed Forces and 
its contractual framework. Chapter four presents the methodology employed in this study. 
Chapter five presents the findings from the interviews and discusses the findings. Chapter 
six concludes and presents an answer to the main research question treated, along with 
limitations, challenges and recommendations for further studies.  
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2. THEORETICAL FOUNDATION 
The main objectives with this chapter is to present the most relevant and significant 
theories and literature related to enforcement of penalty clauses in buyer-supplier 
relationships, and provide a context for understanding why this study was conducted. It 
further attempts to show the relationship with the proposed study and previous work 
related to the topic, categorize the problem and legitimate that this study is relevant and 
necessary to be conducted in order to move knowledge a little bit further within the 
accumulated body of knowledge in purchasing and economic contract theory.  
 
The chapter is divided into three sections. The first section starts of defining when there is 
a delay. Section two categorises the problem within the scientific literature. The third 
section builds a conceptual framework towards the main research question for this study, 
based on previous empirical studies and relevant theory. 
 
2.1 Defining when there is a delay  
The fundamental variables that at least must be present in order to be talking about a 
decision problem is the presence of a binding contract containing a penalty clause and an 
actual delay. There are many definitions for delay. In any analysis of delays to a Project, 
the primary focus is on delays that affect the progress of the entire Project (the Project end 
date or milestone date) or that are critical to Project completion (Trauner et al., 2009). 
Shortages of rigs and personnel have encouraged creativity in designing incentive contract 
in the drilling sector (Osmundsen et al., 2010) therefore the petroleum industry’s 
interpretation of delay can also be of interest. This industry is very vulnerable to delays 
and has developed standard terms for fabrication of larger components to the petroleum 
industry in Norway. In their standard terms NF 05 and NTK 05 they have a very precise 
and accurate definition suited for contractual relationships; there is a delay at the moment 
when the work in the agreed schedule is not contractual fulfilled at the time for a penalty 
sanctioned milestone (Kaasen, 2006).  
 
In the Armed Forces established general purchase conditions (GPC) delays are defined as 
“when the Contractor fails to comply with his obligations in accordance with the 
Agreement at the agreed date and this (delay) is not attributed to factors subject to the 
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Armed Forces’ control, or risks that the Armed Forces have accepted, including Force 
Majeure (GPC). 
 
Within construction theory Trauner et al. (2009) proclaims that there are four basic ways to 
categorize delays; 
 Critical or non critical 
 Excusable or nonexcusable 
 Compensable or noncompensable 
 Concurrent or nonconcurrent 
 
From the Armed Forces general purchase conditions it is clear that the Armed Forces 
reckons an excusable delay for a supplier to be a delay attributed to factors subject the 
Armed Forces control, or attributed to risk the Armed Forces have accepted, including 
Force majeure. This is the Armed Forces leeway to not enforce legally committed penalty 
clauses. 
2.2 Categorizing the proposed study 
The knowledge base in disciplines such as social sciences and humanities moves very 
quickly as researchers develop new theories or confirm or repudiate existing theories (Bui, 
2009). Prior empirical applications of contracting have focused mainly on the make-or-buy 
decision (vertical integration) or long term contracts for tangible products (Ciccotello & 
Hornyak, 1999). Little has been written about the problem of non-enforcement of penalty 
clauses from a buyer’s perspective, and is not easy to categorize the study within the 
common scientific literature. The problem occurs as a consequence from delays to the left 
(upstream) for the focal firm in a traditional supply chain model, placing the problem 
under the purchasing-umbrella. Compared with other business disciplines relatively little 
academic research has been undertaken in the area of purchasing, explaining why there is 
quite a gap in the development of a solid body of knowledge compared with other 
disciplines in business administration (Van Weele, 2005). Purchase theory is broad and 
comprises knowledge about markets, products, different kinds of buying behaviour, 
performance measurement, risk management, bargaining power, negotiating techniques, 
different cost approaches and communication techniques, among others. Mastering this 
theory and the practical implications enables a buyer such as the Armed Forces to decide 
appropriate purchasing strategies, both on an overall level and differentiated from case to 
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case.  Strategic purchasing is about managing supplier relationships in such a way that 
suppliers actively support the company’s overall business strategy and value proposition 
(Van Weele, 2005) Hence, ensuring that suppliers have the appropriate incentives is 
essential within strategic purchasing.  
 
Normally a serious supplier would have the sufficient incentives to deliver the right quality 
to maintain his reputation in the market, and payment upon delivery gives incentives to 
deliver within reasonable time, However when time is a critical success-factor it may be 
suitable to incorporate reward or penalty clauses into the agreement. How to design 
institutions that provide good incentives for economic agents has become a central 
question of economics (Laffont & Martimort, 2002).  
 
There are no waterproof bulkheads between the different sciences, and the same problem 
can be researched within different sciences and draws on each other. If one should try to 
trace this thesis in a database from start to end, it could be labelled that it’s within the 
social science genre  economic and logistics  purchasing (and supply management)  
strategic purchasing  contract theory  incentive theory. Other labels could also be 
right, for instance has the study also strong bound within law, organizational behaviour 
and human decision processes, construction management and the project management field 
regarding time planning and dealing with uncertainty, among others. 
 
Prior work that comes closest to this thesis problem is a quantitative report “Development 
of a decision model for selection of appropriate timely delivery techniques for highway 
projects” (Sillars et al., 2009) that reviews Multi Criteria Decision models in order to 
propose a model that considers various project conditions in determining which delivery 
method would be most likely to encourage timely delivery under the project’s unique 
characteristics, and develops a new algorithm (ibid.). For the quantitative oriented reader 
interested in this thesis problem this report could be of interest. However, this research is 
not built on this report since the researcher has a more qualitative focus, and therefore the 
study builds on streams of literature from purchasing and economic contract theory.  
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2.3 Conceptual framework towards the proposed study 
Market and organizational coordination are the two ideal types of coordination device for 
economic transactions, but in the real world we usually encounter hybrid types of 
organizations (Douma & Schreuder, 2008), where the contract is a common coordination 
device. 
Contracts provide an evolving governance structure for relationships (Seshadri & Mishra, 
2004). The term contract has been used indifferently to refer to different things, but in its 
simplest form a law dictionary defines it to be an agreement between two or more parties 
creating obligations that are enforceable or otherwise recognizable at law (Garner 1999). 
However, since economics is based on incentives and derives it strength from being able to 
predict how people change their behaviour in response to changes in incentives (Fehr & 
Falk 2002), it is the economist view that is interesting in this study. To an economist, a 
contract is an agreement under which two parties make reciprocal commitments in terms 
of their behaviour – a bilateral coordination arrangement (Brosseu & Glachant, 2002).   
But there is a catch. It’s presumed that Nobel Prize winner in physics, Albert Einstein once 
have said “Nothing is more destructive of respect for the government and the law of the 
land than passing laws which cannot be enforced,” and sometimes legal systems prevent 
contracts from being enforced. In contract law there is a central fundamental principle: the 
pacta sunt servanda principle (latin, meaning agreements must be kept) that expresses that 
agreements and stipulations, especially those contained in treaties (international laws) must 
be observed (Garner, 1999). In its most common sense, the principle refers to private 
contracts, stressing that contained clauses are law between the parties, and implies that 
non-fulfillment of respective obligations is a breach of the pact (Wikipedia). It is arguably 
the oldest principle of international law and no international agreement would be binding 
or enforceable without such a rule (Encyclopedia Britannica).  
 
However, laws in most nations are built on common law system or a civil law system, 
which has emerged from different ideological and political backgrounds (Lee, 2003) and 
there is a difference how these systems approach the legality in claiming penalties. The 
problem of penalty clauses is one of the very few in contract law and economic where 
there is considerable disagreement among economists, but also among legal scholars 
(Hatzis, 2003).   
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Contracting parties may stipulate in advance the amount for compensation when there is a 
breach of contract (Hagstrøm, 2003). This is called a penalty clause and can be defined as 
an accessory agreement permitting the contracting parties to establish in advance the 
damages to which a creditor will be entitled in case of non-performance, delay in 
performance, or improper performance by the debtor of its contractual obligations 
(Purcaru, 2009). These clauses can have multiple objectives, were providing incentives for 
the supplier to deliver on-time are one of them. Frequent occurrences are agreements of 
penalty incurred by delays (Hagstrøm, 2003) 
 
Most often the Armed Forces have higher bargaining power than their suppliers and 
therefore it is embedded in the contract that the purchasing agreement is governed by 
Norwegian law. “In the event of disputes concerning the Agreement, attempts shall be 
made to settle the dispute through negotiations. If negotiations fail to succeed, the dispute 
shall be settled in ordinary court of law, using Oslo tingrett as legal venue” (GPC § 15) 
The Norwegian legal system is a mixture of customary law, civil law system, and common 
law traditions (Wikipedia), and thereby prevailing courts understanding that a contract 
between two business professionals are laws between them stands strongly in the Armed 
Forces procurement contracts.  
 
Due to the importance of external suppliers for most companies, procurement and 
governance management is of utmost relevance for achieving competitive advantage 
(Eriksson, 2006). Investments in new defence materiel for the Armed Forces are most 
often organized as projects. In commercial businesses project delays and cost overruns are 
becoming major problems in many projects (Bubshait, 2003), and this is also the issue in 
the Armed Forces projects (OAD PR 13/2005). When a project is delayed the Armed 
Forces, the supplier or both may incur added costs, and as previous mentioned contracts 
provide an evolving governance structure for relationships (Seshadri & Mishra, 2004), and 
often contains penalty clauses to give incentives to the contractor to fulfil his obligations 
within agreed time. A prior survey containing a sample of 55 project managers in the 
Norwegian Armed Forces found that materiel investments contracts in the Armed Forces 
had surprisingly high degree of specification, meaning that they was very detailed and 
carefully adapted to regulations and the investment they were intending (Bjone, 2008). 
Hence, one could in theory argue that contracts in the Armed Forces are complete and 
robust. However, real life contracts are almost always “incomplete” in the sense that there 
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are inevitably some circumstances or contingencies that are left out of the contract, 
because they were either unforeseen or simply to complex and/or expensive to enumerate 
in detail (Hensher & Stanley, 2008). A large and growing literature has analyzed the 
inefficiencies that arise in a world in which contracts are incomplete (Anderlini & Felli, 
2004).   
 
In Adam Smith’s famous economic contribution “Wealth of nations” from 1776, he stated 
that “What are the common wages of labour depends everywhere upon the contract usually 
made between those two parties, whose interests are not the same. The workman desire to 
get as much, the master to give as little as possible” (Smith, 1904). We see from this there 
is a conflict of interests, and Smith further argues that contracting parties will behave with 
self interest. The two basic ingredients of incentive theory are conflicting objectives and 
decentralized information (Laffont & Martimort, 2002). This creates uncertainty towards 
the behaviour of the other part. 
 
Uncertainty is inevitable and present in all business relationships, and therefore the 
specific type of contract attempts to regulates the risk each of the parties’ faces, and each 
party’s obligations attached. Agency theory is directed at the ubiquitous agency 
relationships in which one party (the principal) delegates work to another (the agent) who 
performs that work (Eisenhardt, 1989). If we see the workman as the supplier/agent and 
the master as the buyer(Armed Forces)/principal, agency theory proclaims that the higher 
the level of risk borne by the agent the more incentive the agent has to do a good job 
(Douma & Schreuder, 2008). Hence a fundamental question to ask is if the agent’s 
incentive for doing a good job at some point changes into opportunistic behavior – trying 
to exploit a situation to your own advantage (Douma & Schreuder 2008), due to e.g. risk 
for bankruptcy or dissatisfaction towards the principal, and if so, can enforcement of 
penalties beyond actual damage be counterproductive? 
 
There are numeral reasons to expect that penalizing a supplier might indulge a supplier to 
display opportunistic behaviour. A large number of experimental and field studies indicate 
that economic decisions are in many cases motivated not only by material self interest, but 
also by concerns for fairness (Stanca et al., 2009). Seeing this in light of Seabrights (2004) 
credible theory that natural selection has favoured the evolution of a balance between 
capacity for rational calculation of the cost and benefits of cooperation, and a tendency to 
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repay kindness with kindness and betrayal with revenge (which in literature are called 
reciprocity) and Transaction cost economics’ developed in organizational theory by 
Williamson that assumes humans to be bounded rational – human decision makers may try 
to maximize but their capacity to formulate and solve complex problems are limited 
(Williamson, 2010). Human actors are neither hyper rational nor irrational but are 
attempting effectively to cope with complex contracts that are incomplete (ibid.). Also, 
trust is of crucial importance for the functioning of many economic and noneconomic 
relationships (Herold, 2001), It is therefore naturally at some point that a suppliers human 
behavioural attributes in conjunction with environmental factors will pose a risk for 
opportunistic behaviour towards the Armed Forces regardless of the initial incentive 
motive with the penalty clause, and that principles from agency theory and transaction cost 
economics can help to address this problem. Whereas the primary motives for contracting 
in the agency literature are risk transfer (insurance) and incentive alignment, transaction 
cost economists tend to view contracts more as devices for structuring ex post adjustments 
and for constraining wasteful (rent-dissipating efforts to influence the distribution of gains 
from trade, including especially, ex post bargaining and “hold up” activities in transactions 
supported by relationship-specific investments (Masten & Saussier, 2002). This legitimates 
that the following main research question is necessary to conduct in order to move the 
accumulated body of knowledge within purchasing and economic contract theory I little 
bit further.  
 
How does enforcement of penalty clauses impact supplier’s incentives and 
behavior, and how does this impact the success of the projects 
In the Norwegian Armed Forces? 
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3. THE UNIT OF ANALYSIS AND ITS ENVIRONMENT 
This study holds the Norwegian Armed Forces and their contractual framework as the 
collective unit of analysis. In order to investigate the problem it is of essence to understand 
the objective of the Armed forces, the market they operate in and the external and internal 
boundaries and leeway when dealing with enforcement of penalties. 
The main objective with this chapter is therefore to provide necessary information about 
the market the Armed Forces operate within, and the rules and regulations the armed 
Forces must stay within. 
 
This chapter contains four sections. The first section describes the objective of the Armed 
Forces. The second section provides information about trends and characteristics and some 
numbers on expected future investments for the Armed Forces. The third describes laws 
and regulation, while the fourth section describes self-imposed rules. 
 
3.4 The objective of the decision maker and responsibilities 
The Norwegian Armed Forces are one of the most fundamental instruments for the 
Norwegian State to contribute to the basic and timeless responsibility to create security for 
the State the population and society, and protect and promote its interests and values. The 
Armed Forces receive their funding through the National budget and are dependent on 
support among the Norwegian people.  
 
The overall responsibility for planning the material investments for the Armed Forces lies 
within The Norwegian Ministry of Defence (MoD), whereas the Norwegian Defence 
Logistic Organisation (NDLO) as the business support branch in the Armed Forces puts 
the plans into practice. When the Armed Forces plan for larger investments in defence 
materiel they normally organize this as projects. According to the Armed Forces 
Investment database “FID” there are 269 investments projects running primo 2010.  In 
addition there is always many pre planned projects queued to be approved.  Norwegian 
Armed Forces material projects are categorized into two main categories. Projects 
stipulated to cost more than 500 billion NOK (category 1) must be presented and approved 
by the Storting, while other projects (category 2) can be approved by the Ministry of 
Defence.  
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Sutterfield et al (2007) mentions in a case study from a US defence project  that defence 
projects in USA has been aptly described as one of the world’s most complicated 
processes, and further argues that this stems from the fact that various stakeholders from 
above and below are likely to besiege the project manager.  
  
3.3 Trends and characteristics on the supplier side and future 
investments 
The market for military defense equipment consists of the defense industry on the supplier 
side, and mostly governments on the buyer side. 
 
The defence industry is a large industry. According to Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute (SIPRI, 2009) global military expenditure in 2008 was estimated to 
$1464 billion. This represented an increase of 4 per cent in real terms compared to 2007, 
and of 45 per cent since 1999 (ibid.). Military expenditure comprised approximately 2.4 
per cent of global gross domestic product (GDP) in 2008 (ibid.). The market for military 
defence equipment is a special market. It is characterized by high degree of public interest, 
innovation, secrecy, highly technological, and much resource are put into research and 
development. There is consensus in literature, that military demand in conjunction with 
military research and development programmes was the key to the development and 
disffusion of many technologies especially in the US, like internet, ICT-technologies, GPS 
and other satellite technologies ( Edler & Gerghiou, 2007). In addition to the role as a 
buyer, governments plays a central role in this market as they often tend to favour and 
subsidize own national defence industry, limiting other producers market assets. Since its 
buyers are characterized by being a country, bilateral agreements like repurchase and 
multilateral agreements like joint development are not unusual. For example is the 
development and procurement of Norways new US made F-35 fighter aircrafts a 
cooperation between nine NATO-countries. The market is highly regulated both on a 
national and international level. In accordance with the technological development 
introducing such as network-based defence, the prices for defence equipment increases. 
For example, has study after study showed that the price of combat aircraft and warships 
has been rising substantially faster than inflation, often faster than GDP (in UK) (The 
Economist, 2010). 
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The Norwegian Armed Forces procures from this market in order to carry out their wide 
range of tasks, both during peace, crises, armed conflicts and war. Materiel management is 
an important part of the Armed Forces activities. Approximately 60 percent of the 
Norwegian defence budget is used to procure and maintain materiel. In 2008 The Armed 
Forces purchasing expenditure peaked comprising 24.8 million nkr (Statistisk Sentralbyrå). 
This is an increase of 32,3 percent in real terms compared to 2005. 
 
Figure 3. Norwegian Armed Forces purchasing expenditure 2001-2008 (retrieved from 
SSB.no) 
 
In the period 2010-2013 Norway are planning to spend 39.4 billion NOK on material 
investments for the Armed Forces (MoD – Fremtidige innkjøp til Forsvaret, 2010). This 
number is increased to 44.3 billion NOK for the period 2014-2017 (ibid.).  
 
"The increase in the defense budget affirms this government's intention to build a strong 
military capability as part of our long-term national defense strategy up to 2012," said 
Defense Minister Anne-Grete Strøm-Erichsen (Defencenews, 2008). 
 
A trend within the military industry is rapid development in technology, and material 
bought to the armed forces is often characterized by high degree of complexity and asset 
specificity. Terrorism, proliferation, and conflict will remain key concerns even as 
resource issues move up on the international agenda, and terrorism is unlikely to disappear 
by 2025 (National Intelligence council, 2008). 
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Norway is alongside NATO increasingly operating outside Norway like e.g. Afghanistan, 
Aden bay, Gibraltar and Libya. This change of focus sets higher requirements on the 
purchasing function within the Armed Forces to deliver the right quality to the right time. 
3.1 Regulation context 
The Norwegian people has by referendum opposed themselves from membership in the 
European Union (EU), but is a member of the European Free Trade Organization (EFTA) 
and has approached regulations within EU by joining the European Economic Area (EEA) 
followed by an agreement that regulates trade and other economic issues between EFTA 
and EU (Wikipedia, the free online encyclopaedia). Specifically, it allows Norway to 
participate in the EU’s single market without a conventional EU membership. In exchange, 
Norway is obliged to adopt all EU legislation related to the single market (except those 
pieces of legislation that relate to agriculture and fisheries). (Wikipedia) This led to the 
preparation and decision to implement EUs legislation into Norwegian law in 1992. The 
result was the public procurement act “Lov om offentlige anskaffelser (LOA)” with 
associated regulations “Forskrift om offentlige anskaffelser (FOA)”. Procurement is one 
part of many processes in a business, and LOA/FOA presents the clearest guidelines on 
how public agencies like the armed forces shall conduct their procurement (St. mld. 36) 
 
“The law with corresponding regulations shall contribute to increased value creation in the 
Norwegian community by securing the most effective use of resources when conducting 
public procurement based on businesslike and equal treatment.”(LOA) 
 
The Armed Forces are obliged to follow this law and regulation. Unlike civil businesses 
this means that they are obliged to follow more rigid procedures, secure high ethical 
standard in the purchasing process and neither discriminates possible suppliers based on 
nationality nor treat possible suppliers differently in any other way. This means that the 
Armed Forces must act in a manner that is predictable, and reasoning for decision making 
in the purchasing process must be well documented so it is possible to test the process after 
afterwards. A fundamental requirement in the law is that all purchases shall be based on 
competition when possible.  
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A basic requirement for the law to be applicable is that there exists a contract (veileder til 
reglene om offentlige anskaffelser, 2006). A contract is defined in FOA as a written 
mutual binding between one or more operators with two or more suppliers.  
3.2 Internal framework 
The Armed Forces categorizes their formal documents into three categories.  
Legally binding documents, direction-giving documents, informative documents 
(Forsvarets stabsskole, 2010).  
Ministry of Defence has in addition made an internal instruction book for how the Defence 
sector shall organize and execute its procurement activities, “Anskaffelsesregelverk for 
Forsvarssektoren” (ARF 2008).  
 
NDLO also has internal guidelines to support LOA/FOA and ARF. Provisions in ARF 
impose the Armed Forces to include instruments in the contract to secure the Armed 
Forces losses if delivery is delayed.  
 
Prinsix is a project model and framework available online, that is developed to standardize 
how the Armed Forces shall plan and execute their materiel investments. The project 
model builds on a generic schedule for planning and implementation. In Prinsix there are 
established 16 areas of knowledge to provide the necessary theoretical knowledge and 
guidance to personnel involved in the purchasing process. Time management is the one 
area showing the processes intended to secure delivery on time, while purchasing 
management is the area showing the main processes needed to procure materiel and 
services from suppliers outside the Armed Forces. However, Prinsix says nothing about 
incentives and how to handle penalties, but stresses the importance of high ethical 
standards in the Armed forces procurement activities.  
 
“Armed Forces shall act in accordance with good business practices and ensure a high 
level of business ethics in its proceedings in all phases of the procurement process. The 
most important rules that relate to the ethical standards exist in public law 
(Offentlighetsloven), Public Administration law (Forvaltningsloven), Civil Service Act 
(Tjenestemannsloven), the Securities Trading Act (Lov om verdipapirhandel), Security law 
(sikkerhetsloven), law on public procurement (LOA) and procurement regulations for the 
Armed Forces (ARF).” (Prinsix.no). 
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4. METHODOLOGY  
Keeping in mind the main research question: How does enforcement of penalty clauses 
impact supplier’s incentives and behavior, and how does this impact the success of the 
projects in the Norwegian Armed Forces? This study holds the Norwegian Armed Forces 
and their contractual framework as the unit of analysis and utilized a cross-sectional pre 
structured interview design to access primary data from a sample of contract officers and 
project managers in the Norwegian Armed Forces. Secondary data consist of laws, 
instructions and reports gathered from scientific databases, internet, library books and 
sites. The Armed Forces general purchasing conditions was retrieved from the contract 
department at Haakonsvern Naval base in Bergen.   
 
This chapter explains the procedural framework which the study is conducted within, in 
order to address the research objectives. It is organized into seven sections starting with an 
explanation and justification of the research design, before elaborating the choice of 
subjects and procedures employed to collect primary data. 
 
4.1 Introduction and philosophical orientation 
There is often considerable variation in expectations across disciplines, fields of study, 
(and indeed supervisors), in terms of what a thesis or dissertation should look like 
(Paltridge, 2002). 
The research for this study started late 2009 with discussions over telephone with the head 
of contracting for the Armed Forces located at Oslo, and a personal meeting with the head 
of contracting in Bergen. Conducting a literature search in academic databases like Bibsys, 
ProQuest, Science Direct and ISI web of knowledge showed that little had been written 
about the problem of interest. A lot had been written within the science of law, while the 
result within purchasing and contract theory was rather scarce. As stated in the theoretical 
framework section this study falls under the social science domain. Social science is 
defined as any discipline or branch of science that deals with the sociocultural aspects of 
human behaviour like e.g. economics (Britannica online encyclopaedia), and as stated in 
the literature review is the umbrella where the problem treated in this research falls under. 
Although the majority of empirical research done in logistics, operations and material 
management focuses on quantitative research methods (Elram, 1996), positivism is in the 
social sciences is not regarded as an approach that will lead to interesting or profound 
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insights into complex problems, especially in the field of business and management studies 
(Remenyi et al., 2005). The researcher finds the problem regarding enforcement of 
penalties from a buyer’s perspective complex and comprehensive, and little scientific 
research has been conducted on the problem. Hence the philosophical orientation chosen 
for the research in this thesis is a phenomenological approach. Some argue that it is 
through phenomenological research that it is possible to cope with the complexities of 
business and management (Remenyi et al., 2005). In practise this means that the focus for 
this study is to look beyond the details of the problem addressed in order to understand the 
reality behind the problem, like the root of the problem, how decisions affect incentives 
and behaviour, and the environment the Armed Forces live within. Organizations do not 
operate in a vacuum, but live in an environment that provides the conditions and shapes all 
organizations by exerting economic, social, political and other pressures (Douma & 
Schreuder, 2008). This further implies that the approach to phenomenology to a certain 
degree unfolds as the research proceeds. 
 
4.2 The case study 
Elram (1996) has showed how the case study method can be used in business research, 
with a particular focus on purchasing and logistics research. While case studies doesn’t 
suit every situation, that they do have an important role in many areas of logistics and 
purchasing, like understanding decision-making processes and the impact organizational 
structures has on the role of logistics (Elram, 1996).  
As a research approach the case study is a particular powerful technique in answering who, 
why and how questions (Remenyu et al., 2005), The case study method allows the 
researcher to conduct research that is exploratory, explanatory and descriptive, and since 
one of the purposes for this study was to give the contractual department in the Norwegian 
Armed forces a better foundation for decision-making for a complex problem, a case study 
approach where chosen for this research.  Since not much theory where to be found about 
the direct problem, an intensive research design (many variables, few units) were chosen in 
order to obtain a comprehensive picture about the use of penalty clauses for the collective 
unit “the Norwegian Armed Forces”. 
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4.3  Subjects and sample size 
A phenomenological study usually involves identifying and locating participants who have 
experienced or are experiencing the phenomenon that is being explored (Rudestam & 
Newton, 2001).  
 
Personal interviews were chosen to gather primary data, as open individual interviews are 
very suitable to obtain individuals interpretation of some phenomenon (Jacobsen, 2005). 
The intention with the choice of respondents for the interviews was to use criterion 
sampling to select participants who had experience with delays and penalty clauses in 
contractual relationship where the Armed Forces was one of the parties. In order to answer 
the research questions the best subjects to investigate probably would have been suppliers 
that have been late with deliveries towards the Norwegian Armed Forces. However, that 
would have issued some challenges both regarding availability and time consume in the 
data gathering, biases in the answers and ethical issues. A former relationship experiencing 
delays and penalties in combination can often have been characterized by conflicts, 
negotiations, and sometimes poor climate. It is likely that many suppliers would be 
reluctant to be interviewed by a student with strong ties to the Armed Forces, and if they 
allowed to be interviewed it would be plausible to suspect them to be biased, either due to 
previously bad climate or fear of weaken their opportunities for new contracts. On the 
other hand, project managers and contract officers in the Armed Forces represent the 
“owner” of the problem treated in this study, and it is plausible to believe that they have 
given the problem more thought than the supplier side, and could be a good source for data 
collection. An intuitive indication of their contribution-worthiness for this study could be 
the length of their work-experience regarding procurement within the Armed Forces.  
The appropriate sample size is difficult to decide. Most phenomenological studies engage a 
relatively small number of participants (10 might be appropriate) for a relatively long 
period of time (at least 2 hours) (Rudestam & Newton, 2001).  
The sample picked consisted of five contract officers, and four project managers working 
within naval capacities at Haakonsvern in Bergen. They were all males, and their work 
experience with investment projects in the Armed Forces varied from 4 years to 35 years, 
giving an average of 13 years experience. Five of the interviewed had more than 10 years 
experience. A sample of nine is too little to make any statistical proof representing the 
view of the whole population of contract officers and project managers. However it is still 
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enough to provide the author with valuable information in thesis like this where the 
findings are relevant from the perspective of the user of the findings. 
 
Non probability sampling was used as technique for data collection. Initially a sample was 
picked based on the authors understanding of their knowledge related to the problem in 
focus (judgement sample), but the respondents also tipped the author about others they 
knew had experience with delays and conflict in their projects (snowball sample), and a 
few was picked for their availability regarding time and place (convenience sample). 
 
4.4 Procedures 
Based on the research problem an interview guide was prepared (Appendix 1) Most 
questions was open-ended, while some was structured more like close ended in order in 
order to see the likenesses or differences.  
 
The interview guide contained 18 questions divided into six sections 
Section 1 - concerning delays 
Section 2 – concerning incentive mechanisms and suppliers behavior 
Section 3 – concerning project success  
Section 4 - concerning governmental management  
Section 5 – concerning decision making authority  
Section 6 – concerning core question 
 
As a form of pilot testing of the interview guide the most experienced respondent was 
interviewed first. As a result of this the researcher found it sensible to add a question 
regarding which competence the respondent finds important that a contract officer 
possesses. 
 
The researcher is an employee in Norwegian Armed Forces. Hence security clearance was 
not an issue in order to get access to the respondents. By contacting the Head of 
Contracting and a Project Manager at the Norwegian Naval Base Haakonsvern, the 
researcher was redirected to the Security Officer at NDLO who issued a time limited 
access card to the Departments where most of the Project Managers and Contract Officers 
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are situated. This allowed for free access to the premises enabling the researcher to 
conduct the interviews.  
 
The interviews were conducted behind closed doors at the respondents’ respective offices 
at Haakonsvern Naval Base in Bergen and varied in time from one hour to three hours 
dependent on their experience level, interest for the topic and their available time. The 
skills required for collecting evidence for a case study are much more demanding than for 
experiments and surveys and include the ability to ask suitable questions, the ability to 
listen, being adaptive and flexible, having a firm grasp of the subject, being unbiased and 
not having preconceived notions (Remenyi et al., 2005). The respondents were initially 
informed about the purpose of the study and that the questions were designed in such a 
way that the discussion around the topic was more important than the actual answers they 
gave. This was done in order to grasp the richness and complexity surrounding the 
problem, as opposed to get responses to a scale of binary choices, restricting their 
answering options.  
 
The Armed Force’s activities and money spending are a popular topic for newspapers to 
write about. The organization is dependent on support from politicians and the Norwegian 
tax payers, and wishes to appear professional, with high ethical standards. Hence there are 
personnel pointed out to answer on behalf of the organization.  For the remaining 
personnel there is a culture within not to share information outside a “need to know basis”, 
and scepticism regarding personal quotes. Thus the interviews were conducted without the 
use of dictaphone to create a more relaxed atmosphere, allowing the interview objects to 
speak more freely. The respondents were informed in advance that the researcher basically 
did not intend to quote them in the thesis. If so was the case, they would be given the 
possibility to read the draft and decide if they approve or not. 
 
4.5 Data analysis 
Conducting open interviews makes it difficult for a researcher to present clear results that 
constitute new knowledge. Within scientific writing communities there more or less exist 
accepted norms and guidelines for how to display data and summarize the results of 
statistical analyses when it comes to quantitative studies. For qualitative studies there are 
no such universally valid guidelines. Since qualitative studies produces data that represent 
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word and ideas rather than number and statistics. The collected data was transcribed in Ms 
Word and then categorized into twelve parts, and systemized in a way that all answers 
regarding each question was chronologic following under each question starting with the 
contract officers first, followed by the project managers. Differences and similarities was 
sought sorted out, and are presented in the next chapter. 
No explicit quotations were retrieved, in accordance with the promises to the respondents, 
as outlined earlier in this chapter.  
 
4.6 Validity and reliability 
The choice of research design will have major implications for the study’s validity and 
reliability (Jacobsen 2005). Research can be described and evaluated in terms of three 
types of validity: construct validity, internal validity and external validity, where each 
gives us a different perspective on any particular research investigation (Cozby, 1997). 
 
This study has low internal validity since the methodology employed in the study 
complicates to make strong inferences that one variable causes another variable. It is in the 
researcher’s view that the study can be generalized to other governmental populations and 
settings, and so has external validity. The construct validity could be enhanced by letting 
the study be reviewed by peers or authorities within the procurement environment in the 
Armed Forces. Some phenomenologists will argue that all situations and organisations are 
different and thus the same result cannot ever be obtained, and consequently reliability per 
se is not a central issue (Remenyi et al., 2005) 
 
4.7 Limitations and ethical considerations 
There are certain variables that may impact the outcome of the research. It’s the problem 
of bias since they all represent the one part of the contractual relationship. It is a large 
amount of data and the perception and interpretation of the researcher could influence how 
they are presented in this thesis. Some of the questions were a bit “leading” questions. The 
respondents had little time to make a stance, and so the answers could be different if they 
were answered on e.g. mail and thus had better time to think it through. 
 
The intention was that this study as far as possible should be open to public. It is plausible 
to expect that the researcher’s background and employment status within the Armed 
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Forces might have affected the respondents “openness” towards the interviewer, and that a 
journalist would receive different answers.  Thus there lies a responsibility in protecting 
the individual employer in the Armed Forces, their counterparts in business relationships 
and still not reduce the quality of the data collected. It’s a fine balance for the researcher to 
carefully assess the transcribed data in order to not present thought, fact and ideas that 
might cause unpleasantness for someone.  
Respondents revealed mercantile and safety sensitive details and examples from on-going 
contractual relationships that might implicate and are therefore omitted from the this 
thesis, and the findings could therefore sometimes appear vague. 
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5. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Having reviewed both the transcripts and notes; the interviews provided a wealth of 
information giving insight into today’s practice and provided depth in order to better 
understand the root of the problem making the author more capable to address the research 
objectives. The respondent expressed wide-ranging views. 
 
This chapter is categorized into twelve sections.  Whereas the nine first sections addresses 
the research objectives which attempted to identify issues, the last three sections seeks to 
give recommendations to the Armed Forces. 
 
Each section deals with findings from the interviews and attempts to interpret and analyze 
the findings in order to explain its meaning  
 
5.1 Measuring project success 
Although all the respondents are derived from the same environment; supporting project 
success for the Armed Forces, there were different opinions regards how project success 
normally are measured in their projects. The indicators; performance, cost and time was 
the normality in how project success was measured, and the majority found that 
performance normally was the most import of them. Regarding cost, some of the 
respondents thought that there was little focus on this criterion as long as the procurement 
was within assigned budget. This was justified by little incentive for the project managers 
to pay lower price than the budget allowed. Projects was measured after how close they 
came to budget, and not how well they stayed within budget. It was mentioned that this 
probably also was applicable for the Norwegian public administration in general. This was 
however different from project to project, as projects on a tight budget would have a focus 
on costs in order to achieve the performance requirements. Some of the respondents were 
convinced that in projects with a spacious budget what in the project manager literature is 
called “gold-plating” could occur, meaning that performance was increased beyond the 
actual need.  As long the price is within the budget for the acquisition, there is little focus 
on reducing the costs. The respondents defended this with an argument that there are not 
good personal incentives to reduce costs as long as the project are within requirements for 
performance, time and budget.  
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According to ARF there are mainly three factors influencing if a buyer reaches the 
predetermined goals through the implementation of a contract: delivery at the agreed time, 
with agreed performance to the agreed price.  
 
Doubts often arise about what and who actually determine project success (Lim & 
Mohamed, 1999). To which degree a project is successful or not will always depend on 
who you ask. Project success means different to different stakeholders (Toor & Ogunlana, 
2009). A project manager might be most concerned with progress with the project in the 
form of contractual obligation within his budget, while the end-user might see performance 
or rapid delivery as project success. Some projects will have tighter budget limits than 
others and hence a bigger focus on keeping the costs as low as possible.  
 
Westerveld has made a summary of research on project success criteria where researchers 
has labelled time, cost and quality as immature and short term success. 
 
 
Table 1. Summary of research on project success criteria ( Westerveld, 2003) 
 
Research on project success shows that it is impossible to generate a universal checklist of 
project success criteria suitable for all projects (Westerveld, 2003) 
 
The Armed Forces must accept that assigned budget must be balanced with other sectors 
need like e.g. healthcare, public schools and infrastructure. Normally the budgets are tight 
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in all levels from top (Governments public purse) to bottom (Project managers) in order to 
prevent agents from “gold-plating”. An agent should only buy what is needed, and if the 
budget is to large he could be tempted to buy better than needed. A problem is that the 
opinion of what is needed might differ between the different stakeholders.  
 
Figure 4. Performance measurement criteria for mega projects (Toor & Ogunlana, 2009) 
 
It is very common for construction projects to suffer from delays and budget overruns due 
ro disputes among the parties (Toor & Ogunlana 2009). Toor and Ogunlana (2009) has 
carried out an empirical investigation on a mega airport project in Bangkok where the 
findings showed that construction stakeholders are starting to think beyond the traditional 
measures of project performance: on time, on budget and according to specification. Their 
research suggests that Figure 3 should be considered as the new measure of performance, 
where minimized disputes and conflicts are suggested as one of the key performance 
indicators.  The Armed Forces should revise how their measure project success and 
thereby influence the project managers’ incentives.   
 
5.2 Frequency of delays  
The majority of the interviewees had experienced that delays was more common than on 
time deliveries. Only two of the interviewees experienced that on time deliveries was more 
common. There is a distinguishing characteristic of the latter two interviewees’ project 
experience compared to the others. Their projects are more characterized by many smaller 
purchases like e.g. smaller quantities of hand weapons. They still pointed out that delays 
were not unusual. One of them estimated 30% of the deliveries to be delayed. 
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This confirmed previously reports from the Office Auditor General, that delayed 
procurement projects is a problem within the Armed Forces. Looking at the two 
respondents that stood out, it is likely to believe that the characteristics of the products 
strongly influence the risk for delays. While less complex products and “products of the 
shelf” are easier for a supplier to estimate delivery time correctly, projects contracting 
products like e.g. warships that are characterized by higher degree of complexity and 
innovation, has higher risk for unforeseen problems and hence delays. 
 
5.3 Reasons for delays 
It was consensus among all the interviewees that the two most common reasons for delay 
are that suppliers underestimate the scope of work and/or experiences problems with 
deliveries from sub suppliers. Some of the respondents assumed that the underestimation 
of the scope of work was attributed to complicated, unclear, or deficient specifications, 
while others claimed that the reason was poor project planning of the supplier. 
Interestingly some felt that that the personnel working within the  project organization in 
the Armed Forces was overworked or lacked the necessary technical expertise, thus 
disabling them to be proactive in following up their projects, leaving the supplier “left to 
themselves”. Other reasons for delay pointed was underestimation of the time consume 
making the documentation,  complicated  regulations and requirements to follow technical 
standards from both NATO (NATOSTANAG) and commercial business, that the suppliers 
are unfamiliar with. As expected Force majeure incidents like environmental forces 
(volcano ash prevented from flying and frozen gulfs prevented testing boats) or in some 
cases denied export licenses from foreign suppliers’ governmental authorities, and changes 
in scope were mentioned as reasons for delays. 
 
There may be many reasons why projects are delayed, both within the Armed Forces and 
within the suppliers (intra-firm) and between the Armed Forces and the supplier (inter-
firm) as well as external influences such as force majeure. The findings here match with 
transaction cost economics that assumes that humans are bounded rational, and this poses a 
problem under uncertainty. Material procured for the armed forces are often characterized 
by being highly technological with ambiguous product specification, and is often 
specialized and unique for the tasks the Armed Forces are set out to do. This high degree 
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of asset specificity can be seen as bilateral since the suppliers would have difficulties 
selling the products to others, and the Armed Forces will have high exit costs if decided to 
breach the contract and find a new qualified supplier, so the Armed Forces are in some 
way often “locked “ to their supplier and vice versa. Another characterization of complex 
projects like e.g. frigates is that it may take many years from the need is identified to there 
exist a contract, and then many years again to final delivery. This in combination with the 
rapid development in new technology and political changes like e.g. chasing pirates 
outside Somalia indicates many change orders, utterly complicating the procurement 
process. 
5.4 Delays effect on the unit of analysis 
Some had experienced that in some cases delays had been beneficial for the Armed Forces 
in cases where the Armed Forces was not ready to receive as a result of lack of facilities or 
lack of personal to do acceptance tests. On a general basis it was argued that since the 
Armed Forces is a non-profit organization delays would delay the consumption of the 
operating budget, thus giving the Armed Forces an interest rate advantage. However, the 
downside could be reduced combat readiness.  
 
The respondents were not asked about the negative effects, but this is however discussed 
here. Since the end of the 1980s, the time-to-market of new products has become a 
competitive advantage, particularly in markets where the first mover has a strong 
advantage (Mahmoud-Jouni et al., 2004). For many commercial businesses time is thus 
essential as it inflicts direct costs on them and may lead to loss of market shares and 
inventories of obsolescence products. Some might argue that this doesn’t apply for the 
Armed Forces since they don’t resell final products or put goods into own production for 
profit. Project procurement is always done for a basic reason (though the reasons can be 
wrong), to satisfy a need. For the Armed Forces it is to satisfy a need to directly or 
indirectly maintain or enhance their combat capability. Delays in deliveries may inflict 
transaction costs on the Norwegian forces. Since the Armed Forces are a non profit 
organisation these costs are difficult to stipulate. Direct costs can be planned labour like 
courses, training and inspection that has to be postponed due to the delay. Indirect costs 
might be administrative costs for the project due to the delay. The most difficult costs to 
stipulate are the reduced combat capability cause by the delay. There could also be a 
higher risk of continuing to operate older equipment while waiting for delivery, so 
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ultimately delays can indirect cause fatalities. If it doesn’t suit the Armed Forces to receive 
the materiel within agreed time it surely is an upside, not to be neglected, e.g. the Armed 
Forces doesn’t  carry the risk for damage of the materiel, nor either does the guarantee 
period start without the Armed Forces being able to use the contract subject as intended. 
 
5.5 Frequency and variations of incentive mechanism 
All respondents stated that the most common incentive mechanism had been a penalty 
clause where it is agreed 1 per mille per days of delay, limited to 10 percent of the total 
contract value, except for one project manager that didn’t know, and surprisingly argued 
that this kind of information only was details for the contract officer’s knowledge. 
Although the above use of penalty clauses was the most common, different anomalies did 
occur, and some of the respondents were known to contracts with 5 per mille as the 
maximum daily penalty, and a the limiting total penalty to range from 6 percent to 15 
percent. Other instruments used was an exponential daily penalty, starting low and 
increasing the longer the delay proceeds, and what is called a “grace period” where the 
supplier is giving a period after the milestone delivery date to deliver without the penalty 
clause being enforced.  If the delivery is accepted after the “grace period” the buyer is 
entitled to penalty from the grace period in addition to the delay after. The use of positive 
incentive mechanisms was not known to the respondents, except one respondent that 
remembered it had been used on a project that was very time urgent in the 1970s.  
 
5.6 Contractual penalty clause as incitement for reducing risk of 
delays and its effect on supplier behaviour 
A marginal majority of the respondent was of the impression that penalty clause as 
incitement for reducing risk of delay was a necessity, and that delays could have been 
longer without such a clause. Some argued that reason for this could be that in some cases 
the supplier had other contractual obligations of a larger volume like e.g. towards the US 
Armed Forces, and then wouldn’t prioritize the Norwegian Armed Forces if there were no 
element of penalty. A minority was of the opinion that the supplier would prioritize to 
deliver as fast as possible since there already was an incentive in receiving payment to 
make amends towards their sub suppliers, making the clause superfluous. However, the 
respondents unanimously agreed that the use of positive incentive mechanisms could be 
useful if time is critical. It could give a signal of an important requirement in the contract, 
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instead of the “overall whip”. Some also believed it would be highly motivational to have 
a focus on making more money, than risking losing money if they are delayed. 
The opinion regarding the effect penalties in contracts have on suppliers’ behaviour was 
widespread. Some argued that it did not have any effect since most suppliers was 
concerned about their reputation, while others claimed that avoiding penalties was more 
important than reputation, and that suppliers had all focus on delivering a product at the 
agreed milestone, and that this might give rise to sloppiness regarding quality and 
documentation. The end result would be poorer and quality issues that could have been 
prevented are postponed to complaint period. Some pointed out that the Armed Forces are 
inconsistent in collecting penalties, and that suppliers might behave irrational since they 
feel the Armed Forces are unreasonable. 
 
There are many drawbacks for a supplier when he is delayed First of all the Armed Forces 
will withhold payment until delivery are approved, so the supplier loose the interest rate, in 
other words,  the possibility to alternative use of money. In addition the delay forces him 
to have focus on a project that should have been ended, and the need to put in extra labour 
in production and/or administration comes with a cost. Future projects might have to be 
postponed or dealt with at the same time. For future sales the supplier faces the risk of 
weakening their reputation in the market. This indicates that the minority of the respondent 
has a point. 
 
5.7 Enforcement of contractual penalty clauses impact on delays 
An overwhelming majority of the respondents had the impression that enforcement of 
penalty clause could utterly delay the projects, and some had experienced this in practice. 
Other had experienced that the question of enforcement of penalties arises to late to have 
an impact on the progress of the project. 
This can be due to change in focus from the supplier side, where efforts to argument for 
reducing the daily fines is given priority rather than focusing on project completion. This 
can further be attributed to opportunism or feeling of unfairness. 
 
5.8 Non enforcement of penalties effect on project success 
There was a divergent opinion of the effect non-enforcement of penalties had on the 
degree of project success. While some believed that the decision was taken too late to have 
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an impact on the project, others pointed that there are so many elements in a contractual 
relationship, and the parties must live with each other long after delivery, solving quality, 
maintenance and upgrade issues, indicating that not enforcing the penalties would enhance 
the relationship.  
 
5.9 Special considerations for governmental governance  
As opposed to commercial business the Armed Forces are subject to more rigid regulations 
and procedures, and must secure competition and equal behavior to suppliers. Many 
respondents pointed out that the Armed Forces are less feasible to have favorites among 
suppliers or establish long term relationships, and the contract is a more important 
instrument to regulate the relationship than between non-governmental buyers. Although 
the private sector should also behave ethical some of the respondent found them “tougher” 
than the Armed Forces, as the Armed Forces attend a higher pressure and interest from 
media. This employs behavior at the Armed forces that mitigate to appear reprehensible. 
Some pointed out that the Armed Forces are an operator in the society at many levels, 
bigger and more powerful as opposed to suppliers that are smaller economical, and this 
bureaucracy also implies that processes are more time-consuming.   
Others argued that the Armed Forces must follow political guidelines, and that this 
sometimes constrains the authority to do the best investment for the Armed Forces e.g. that 
new coastguard vessel must be built in Norway, or requirements for a repurchase 
agreement creates more expensive procurements, than for a commercial buyer. Many 
mentioned that the Armed Forces had less emphasis on costs than their suppliers. 
Interesting some thought that the Armed Forces often are dependent on suppliers selling 
“weird special products”, and sometimes display arrogance and has unrealistic 
expectations towards their suppliers. 
 
Collection of public revenues is a key prerequisite for developing a welfare society and a 
user-oriented public sector.. The requirements provided for by law and agreement are 
legitimate claims that it is important to be paid in full (NOU:12, 2007) 
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5.10 Level of decision making authority (Decentralization versus 
centralization) 
Although the paragraph in ARF regarding not to enforce penalty (accept longer delivery 
time) when value is above 250.000 NOK ex. VAT, decreases NDLO’s action area and 
increases bureaucracy, all but one of  the interviewed was positive to the concept of a two-
parted Decision making unit (DMU). Arguments in favour of current solution are that in 
many cases MoD is the principal and should be informed. In the same way that MoD 
demands a repurchase-agreement for purchases above 50 million NOK. 
Another argument was that MoD as part of the Government is closer to the Norwegian 
industry and the right authority to execute industrial policy measures that is beyond 
economical thinking like e.g. prevent bankruptcy of suppliers to safeguard shipyard-jobs. 
One respondent also pointed that MoD might also be interested in monitoring Norwegians 
defence industries delivery capabilities. The majority of the interviewed though, wanted 
the limit to be higher. It’s “pocket change” as one mentioned.  While the limit may be 
suitable or to high for low cost projects, for the larger projects it shouldn’t be much delays 
before the limit is reached. If a delivery worth of 250 million NOK is delayed one day the 
penalty claim would have reached the limit already after the first day.  
 
The best alternative to decentralized decision-making is normally not ignorant 
centralization, but what can be called communication-based centralization (Vagstad, 2000) 
 
Centralization allows the MoD on behalf of the parliament (Stortinget) to retain control 
over important decisions. However, relevant information is often held by the agencies 
(Norwegian Defence Procurement division) and not by the government (MoD) and to 
utilize this local information the government must either elicit it or delegate decision-
making (Vagstad, 2000)  
 
 
5.11 Factors excusing suppliers from being penalized 
Most respondents found this a though question to reply as there are many shades of gray  
and no “all-black or all-white” solutions, as the Armed Forces often are partly guilty for 
the delay like e.g. increase in scope. A common denominator for all respondents’ 
acceptations for excusing the suppliers for penalties comes close to fairness, and it was 
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stressed by many that the decision must be based on reasonable considerations. However, 
some felt that being part of a hierarchical system limits the decision makers to depart what 
is contractual committed. Other reasons that the respondents found as excusable for not 
enforcing penalties was to simplify, don’t create barriers to entry, feeling sorry for the 
supplier, avoid insolvency and keep the supplier in the market. Interestingly some pointed 
out that the penalty clause only should be used as a mean to force the suppliers to focus on 
completion of the delivery, and not enforce the penalty if the supplier did so. As one of the 
respondents mentioned - the penalty clause shouldn’t be enforced if the supplier “expelled 
as much effort as possible”.  
 
Iyer et al. (2008) has identified delays within the construction industry and classified these 
into non- excusable delays and excusable delays. 
 
Table 2. Classifications of non- excusable delays and excusable delays (Iyer et al. 2008). 
 
 
The tables excusable delays come close to what the respondents would categorize as 
fairness, meaning that the supplier has acted regards fulfillment of his obligations as one 
would expect of a serious business partner. 
 
5.12 Competence needed at decision making unit 
The majority of the respondents found integrity as the most prominent qualification needed 
by the contract officers. While the project manager should be “the good guy” securing 
drive in the project, the contract officer should have the ability play “the bad guy” to be 
though and less indulgent. Many respondents stressed the necessity that the contract officer 
having a holistic overview of the circumstances surrounding the procurement, and as one 
respondent added, “With a mix of creativity and a rigid mindset”. Other qualities identified 
was high work capacity, simultaneous capacity, analytical skills, assessment ability, 
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negotiation capability, cooperating capability, knowledgeable about economical principles, 
project management, governmental regulation, and technological insight is an advantage.  
 
The prime consideration in its role as an employee of central government’s is the concern 
for political loyalty (Christensen et al., 2008). The current Stoltenberg II Government in 
Norway stresses that “sufficient expertise is a prerequisite for making good and 
appropriate public procurement” (St.mld. 36).  
 
Standardization in order to streamline a business is a much used principle/tool within 
logistic and economic theory. However, Douma and Schreuder (2008) argue that 
professional work cannot be standardized. All an organization can do is standardize the 
skills required for executing this work by, for instance, demanding a certain type of 
training (Douma & Schreuder, 2008).  
 
Different need for skills that are prominent differs from project to project, but Tassabehji 
and Moorhouse (2008) have developed a taxonomy of procurement skills, where they 
classify procurement skills into five groupings that more accurately mirror the 
requirements of modern day procurement professionals. 
 
 
Figure 5. Categorization of skill types required for procurement (Tassabehji & Moorhouse, 
2008). 
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In order to be effective, not all procurement professionals will necessarily be operating on 
the same level, and thus will not require all the skills in the figure (Tassabehji & 
Moorhouse, 2008). The essence is that a governmental buyer such as the Armed Forces 
must have a consciously approach to which skills are needed, which skills they already 
possesses and recruit contract officers that fills the gap between these.  
 
It is not the skills of the single contract officer that is prevailing, but the skills of the 
contract division as a whole. Drawing on Adam Smith’s argument that division of labour 
leads to specialization, and specialization creates efficiency, team composition is essential 
with regard to enforcement of penalty decisions. The Norwegian procurement department 
is matrix organized and the need of skills that are more prominent than others differs from 
project to project and in the different phases of the project. This implies that this way of 
thought regarding matrix organization can also be employed within the contract division. 
 
While project officers are recruited with various backgrounds, the contract officers are 
most often recruited with a background within law or economics and logistics where the 
understanding of legislation is the most prevailing qualification requirement.  
 
Interpersonal skills are the skills necessary for interaction with people in teams and on 
individual level including written and oral communication, conflict resolution, influencing 
and persuasion, group dynamics, leadership, problem solving and interpersonal and 
cultural awareness (Tassabehji & Moorhouse, 2008).  
 
It is no longer necessary to make a case for the importance of learning to employees and 
employers in today’s tumultuous business world, and the need for continual learning and 
development is now taken for given (Seibert, 1999) 
It is a widespread understanding that experience is an important property for a good 
contract officer, and that there is a difference between what’s been taught in school and 
handling the complexity and uncertainty in “real life projects”.  
 
Experience is important, but as the Armed Forces competes with a civilian industry 
regarding recruiting and keeping key competencies this experience is hard to gain. It is 
therefore of outmost importance that team composition also consist of newcomers in order 
to build experienced and competent contract officers 
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
The main objective with this chapter is to summarise the findings and present some 
limitations with the study and recommendations for future research. 
The chapter is organized into two sections. Section one summarizes the findings and 
concludes the study. The second section reflects around the significance and limitations of 
the study, and what the author found most challenging, before recommend future research. 
 
6.1 Conclusions 
Returning to our main research question. How does enforcement of penalty clauses impact 
supplier’s incentives and behavior, and how does this impact the success of the projects in 
the Norwegian Armed Forces? 
 
Conducting this research did not give a single solution to this problem. There are many 
variables affecting the decision and the circumstances around the decision-making may 
differ from project to project or acquisition to acquisition.  
 
Based on opinions and views from a sample of nine project managers and contract officers 
this study found indications that the Armed Forces measure success in their procurements 
projects prioritized as the right performance within the right time, within budget. Delays 
are more common than on-time deliveries, and most often this is due to suppliers 
underestimation of scope or underestimation of sub suppliers ability to deliver. There are 
variations in the design of penalty clauses. It shows that there are widespread opinions 
regarding the expediency of embedding penalty clauses in contracts, and the effect 
enforcing them or not, have on incentives, supplier behavior, and on the degree of project 
success. The decision making unit must do trade-offs to achieve the best possible project 
implementation within the boundaries of the contract, regulations and the stakeholders 
interest. The Armed Forces are less feasible to have favorites among suppliers or establish 
long term relationships, and the contract is a more important instrument to regulate the 
relationship than between non-governmental buyers. Having a two-parted decision making 
unit seem appropriable, but the limit should be considered increased.  
 
Contract officers should be creative and rigid with a holistic overview. Team composition 
is essential, and the Armed Forces should consider how interpersonal skills are 
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incorporated in the team composition like e.g. conflict resolution that necessitates 
knowledge regarding human behaviour outside economical or rational incentives.  
Although this study was a small project, it provided rich insights into the complexity 
governmental buyer faces with regards to how handle delays in order to secure project 
success. 
 
6.2 Final remarks 
 
6.2.1 Significance of this thesis 
In the business and management research context a significant case study is one which is 
of general interest to business and management professionals (Remenyi et al., 2005).  
Decision making are done by people, affecting people, and people are bounded rationally. 
However, bounded rationality only imposes a problem in environments that are 
characterized by uncertainty/complexity. Training/schooling, experience and reflection 
around a problem improves a contract officer’s ability to better handle complex and 
uncertain situations. Hence, reading this thesis could strengthen the reader’s knowledge 
concerning the problem. 
This thesis might have contributed to a better understanding of the complexity in the 
decision making a governmental buyer faces when delays occur. 
 
6.2.2  Limitations 
This thesis uses the case study as research tactic. The case study as an area of research is 
fraught with danger primarily due to the problem of subjectivity and biases (Remenyi et 
al., 2005). It is likely that the researcher had reflected around the topic more than the 
sample of respondents, and the researchers knowledge increased from interview to 
interview and some questions was “leading” in nature.  
One of the major limitations in this study is that is based on a small sample of project 
managers and contract officers from one employer.  
 
6.1.3 Most challenging part 
The key characteristic of scientific writing is clarity (Day, 1995). Successful scientific 
experimentation is the result of a clear mind attacking a clearly stated problem and 
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producing clearly stated conclusions (ibid.). Defining what a master thesis is all about is a 
challenge in itself since it means moving on unfamiliar ground, from a student’s 
perspective. For this specific project the researcher found three elements as the most 
challenging.  
 
Referring to the purpose of this thesis the researcher firstly found it challenging to make 
the trade-off between writing something useful for an organization (report) and contribute 
to the body of knowledge within a scientific field (paper) in the same document. This 
stresses the importance of choosing research design, and in that way the case study is an 
effective method as it may be used in a number of different ways that accommodate the 
complexity in enforcement of penalties and “encourages the blending of action and 
knowledge” (Remenyi et al 2005). 
 
Secondly, the problem addressed in this research is complex and span over many different 
fields of interest. Hence, it has also been challenging to not to go to deep in to the juridical 
domain, nor either the psychology domain, but have focus within management and 
purchasing. This stresses the importance of narrowing and refining the research area, and 
categorize the problem according to which scientific community it most resembles.  
 
The third challenge concerns time planning, hereby the trade off between searching and 
reading on one side, and reflecting and writing on the other side. This stresses the necessity 
to know the limitations of what is possible to do within a master thesis, having a realistic 
time plan and doing necessary tradeoffs all the way to secure a “good enough” 
performance (the thesis) within its time (actual time subtracted time needed to balance life) 
and cost (efforts and energy) limits. 
 
These three challenges directly means that it is especially important to have a basic 
structure, clear understanding of the problem and how your methodology will address the 
problem. 
 
6.1.4 Recommendations for future research 
This thesis attempted to embrace a problem with a scientific approach. As opposed to 
intuition where cognitive and motivational biases might affect our perception of the world, 
the researcher has invested time and effort reading and reflecting around the problem, and 
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hence giving this thesis some kind of authority. There is nothing wrong with accepting the 
assertions of authority as long as we don’t accept them as scientific evidence (Cozby, 
1997). Scientists often rely on intuition and assertions of authorities for ideas for research 
(Cosby, 1997). This thesis can inspire to go deeper into parts of it. For example the role of 
trust and experienced fairness on the supplier. 
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Appendix 1  INTERVIEW GUIDE – Applied language 
 
Personalia: 
Stilling……. 
Antall år jobbet med anskaffelser i Forsvaret……… 
 
 
 
Forsinkelser: 
Hvor vanlig har det vært at leverandøren har vært forsinket ift til kontrakten i de 
prosjektene du har jobbet for? 
 
Hva skyldes forsinkelsene? 
 
Tror du forsinkelsene hadde vært enda større uten dagbot klausul i kontrakten? 
 
Har du inntrykk av at dagbøter kan forsinke prosjektet ytterligere som følge av f.eks 
uoverensstemmelser og skifte av fokus? 
 
Har du opplevd at forsinkelser har vært til det positive for Forsvaret? 
 
 
 
Insentivmekanismer og leverandørs fremferd: 
Har 1 promille per dag, maksimalt 10 prosent vært den vanligste incentivmekanismen i 
kontraktene du har jobbet med? 
 
Har det vært andre incentivmekanismer i kontraktene du kjenner til? 
 
Dagbot er jo en slags straff. ARF åpner opp for å bruke belønningsmekanismer som f. eks 
bonuser. Kjenner du til om dette har vært brukt i Forsvarets prosjekter? 
 
Tror du positive belønningsmekanismer har noe for seg? 
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Kan bøtene etter din mening fremtvinge opportunistisk fremferd hos leverandøren? 
 
 
Prosjektsuksess 
Hvordan måles normalt prosjektsuksess i de prosjektene du har jobbet med? 
 
Tror du det i noen tilfeller vill vært større grad av prosjektsuksess hvis man ikke hadde 
håndhevd dagbøtene? 
 
Hvis ja, det er jo da en tapt inntekt for staten. Ville graden av økt prosjektsuksess overgå 
tapt inntekt? 
 
 
Statlig versus privat styring (etikk?) 
Bør Forsvaret som en del av staten styre etter et kommersielt profittmaksimeringsresultat 
og forholde seg til kontrakten uansett, eller har Forsvaret et særlig etisk aspekt å ivareta 
(fairness)? 
 
Hva er de største forskjellene mellom Forsvaret og profesjonelle sivile aktørers 
innkjøpsadferd? Rutiner, krav, forventninger.  
 
 
 
Avgjørelsesmyndighet 
Etter ARF ligger avgjørelsesmyndigheten til å ettergi bøter hos FD for beløp over 250.000 
NOK. Hvor mener du avgjørelsesmyndigheten bør ligge i spørsmålet om å ettergi dagbøter 
ved forsinkleser, og hvorfor? (differensier gjerne) 
 
 
Kjernespørsmål 
Hvilke grunner mener du kunne fritatt leverandør fra dagbøter? 
 
Kan du gi eksempler på prosjekter der bøtene ble redusert, og årsaken til reduseringen?  
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Appendix 2  INTERVIEW GUIDE -  English translation 
 
Personal details 
Position ... .... 
Number of years worked in procurement in the military ... ... ... 
 
 
 
Delays: 
 
How common has it been that the vendor has been delayed in relation to the contract in 
the projects you have worked for? 
 
What caused the delays? 
 
Do you think the delays had been even bigger without penalty clause in the contract? 
 
Do you have the impression that the daily penalties could delay the project further as a 
result of inconsistencies and change of focus? 
 
Have you experienced that delays have been positive for the Armed Forces? 
 
 
 
Incentive Mechanisms and supplier's conduct: 
Has 1 per mille per day, maximum 10 per cent been the most common incentive 
mechanism in the contracts you have worked with? 
 
Have there been other incentive mechanisms in contracts, you know? 
 
Penalties are some sort of punishment. ARF opens up for using reward mechanisms such 
as bonuses. Do you know if this has been used in the military projects? 
 
Do you think positive reward mechanisms have anything to offer? 
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Can penalties in your opinion enforce opportunistic behavior at the supplier? 
 
 
Project Success 
How is normally the project's success measured in the projects you worked with? 
 
Do you think that in some cases there would be a greater degree of project success if the 
Armed Forces didn’t enforce the penalties? 
 
If yes, that's lost revenue for the state. Would the degree of increased project success 
surpass the lost income? 
 
 
State versus private governance (ethics?) 
Should the Armed Forces as part of the state board for a commercial profit maximization 
results and relate to the contract regardless, or have the Armed Forces a special defense 
to safeguard the ethical aspects (fairness)? 
 
What are the main differences between military and civilian professional actors' 
purchasing behavior? (Procedures, requirements, expectations). 
 
 
 
Decision authority 
According to ARF; MoD has the decision authority to waive penalties for amounts over 
250,000 NOK. At which level do you think the decision authority should be in question to 
waive penalties, and why is that? (Please differentiate) 
 
 
Core Questions 
Which reasons do you think could exempt the supplier from being penalized? 
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Can you give examples of projects where the penalties were reduced, and the reason 
behind the reduction? 
 
 
 
